339 research outputs found
Digital Signatures Based on the Hardness of Ideal Lattice Problems in all Rings
Many practical lattice-based schemes are built upon the Ring-SIS or Ring-LWE problems, which are problems that are based on the presumed difficulty of finding low-weight solutions to linear equations over polynomial rings . Our belief in the asymptotic computational hardness of these problems rests in part on the fact that there are reduction showing that solving them is as hard as finding short vectors in all lattices that correspond to ideals of the polynomial ring . These reductions, however, do not give us an indication as to the effect that the polynomial , which defines the ring, has on the average-case or worst-case problems. \\
As of today, there haven\u27t been any weaknesses found in Ring-SIS or Ring-LWE problems when one uses an which leads to a meaningful worst-case to average-case reduction, but there have been some recent algorithms for related problems that heavily use the algebraic structures of the underlying rings. It is thus conceivable that some rings could give rise to more difficult instances of Ring-SIS and Ring-LWE than other rings. A more ideal scenario would therefore be if there would be an average-case problem, allowing for efficient cryptographic constructions, that is based on the hardness of finding short vectors in ideals of for \emph{every} .\\
In this work, we show that the above may actually be possible. We construct a digital signature scheme based (in the random oracle model) on a simple adaptation of the Ring-SIS problem which is as hard to break as worst-case problems in every whose degree is bounded by the parameters of the scheme. Up to constant factors, our scheme is as efficient as the highly practical schemes that work over the ring
Short, Invertible Elements in Partially Splitting Cyclotomic Rings and Applications to Lattice-Based Zero-Knowledge Proofs
When constructing practical zero-knowledge proofs based on the hardness of the Ring-LWE or the Ring-SIS problems over polynomial rings , it is often necessary that the challenges come from a set that satisfies three properties: the set should be large (around ), the elements in it should have small norms, and all the non-zero elements in the difference set should be invertible. The first two properties are straightforward to satisfy, while the third one requires us to make efficiency compromises. We can either work over rings where the polynomial only splits into two irreducible factors modulo , which makes the speed of the multiplication operation in the ring sub-optimal; or we can limit our challenge set to polynomials of smaller degree, which requires them to have (much) larger norms.
In this work we show that one can use the optimal challenge sets and still have the polynomial split into more than two factors. This comes as a direct application of our more general result that states that all non-zero polynomials with ``small\u27\u27 coefficients in the cyclotomic ring are invertible (where ``small\u27\u27 depends on the size of and how many irreducible factors the cyclotomic polynomial splits into). We furthermore establish sufficient conditions for under which will split in such fashion.
For the purposes of implementation, if the polynomial splits into factors, we can run FFT for levels until switching to Karatsuba multiplication. Experimentally, we show that increasing the number of levels from one to three or four results in a speedup by a factor of -- . We point out that this improvement comes completely for free simply by choosing a modulus that has certain algebraic properties. In addition to the speed improvement, having the polynomial split into many factors has other applications -- e.g. when one embeds information into the Chinese Remainder representation of the ring elements, the more the polynomial splits, the more information one can embed into an element
Accountable Tracing Signatures from Lattices
Group signatures allow users of a group to sign messages anonymously in the
name of the group, while incorporating a tracing mechanism to revoke anonymity
and identify the signer of any message. Since its introduction by Chaum and van
Heyst (EUROCRYPT 1991), numerous proposals have been put forward, yielding
various improvements on security, efficiency and functionality. However, a
drawback of traditional group signatures is that the opening authority is given
too much power, i.e., he can indiscriminately revoke anonymity and there is no
mechanism to keep him accountable. To overcome this problem, Kohlweiss and
Miers (PoPET 2015) introduced the notion of accountable tracing signatures
(ATS) - an enhanced group signature variant in which the opening authority is
kept accountable for his actions. Kohlweiss and Miers demonstrated a generic
construction of ATS and put forward a concrete instantiation based on
number-theoretic assumptions. To the best of our knowledge, no other ATS scheme
has been known, and the problem of instantiating ATS under post-quantum
assumptions, e.g., lattices, remains open to date.
In this work, we provide the first lattice-based accountable tracing
signature scheme. The scheme satisfies the security requirements suggested by
Kohlweiss and Miers, assuming the hardness of the Ring Short Integer Solution
(RSIS) and the Ring Learning With Errors (RLWE) problems. At the heart of our
construction are a lattice-based key-oblivious encryption scheme and a
zero-knowledge argument system allowing to prove that a given ciphertext is a
valid RLWE encryption under some hidden yet certified key. These technical
building blocks may be of independent interest, e.g., they can be useful for
the design of other lattice-based privacy-preserving protocols.Comment: CT-RSA 201
Provably weak instances of ring-LWE revisited
In CRYPTO 2015, Elias, Lauter, Ozman and Stange described an attack on the non-dual decision version of the ring learning with errors problem (RLWE) for two special families of defining polynomials, whose construction depends on the modulus q that is being used. For particularly chosen error parameters, they managed to solve non-dual decision RLWE given 20 samples, with a success rate ranging from 10% to 80%. In this paper we show how to solve the search version for the same families and error parameters, using only 7 samples with a success rate of 100%. Moreover our attack works for every modulus q instead of the q that was used to construct the defining polynomial. The attack is based on the observation that the RLWE error distribution for these families of polynomials is very skewed in the directions of the polynomial basis. For the parameters chosen by Elias et al. the smallest errors are negligible and simple linear algebra suffices to recover the secret. But enlarging the error paremeters makes the largest errors wrap around, thereby turning the RLWE problem unsuitable for cryptographic applications. These observations also apply to dual RLWE, but do not contradict the seminal work by Lyubashevsky, Peikert and Regev
Quadratic Time, Linear Space Algorithms for Gram-Schmidt Orthogonalization and Gaussian Sampling in Structured Lattices
International audienceA procedure for sampling lattice vectors is at the heart of many lattice constructions, and the algorithm of Klein (SODA 2000) and Gentry, Peikert, Vaikuntanathan (STOC 2008) is currently the one that produces the shortest vectors. But due to the fact that its most time-efficient (quadratic-time) variant requires the storage of the Gram-Schmidt basis, the asymptotic space requirements of this algorithm are the same for general and ideal lattices. The main result of the current work is a series of algorithms that ultimately lead to a sampling procedure producing the same outputs as the Klein/GPV one, but requiring only linear-storage when working on lattices used in ideal-lattice cryptography. The reduced storage directly leads to a reduction in key-sizes by a factor of Ω(d), and makes cryptographic constructions requiring lattice sampling much more suitable for practical applications. At the core of our improvements is a new, faster algorithm for computing the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of a set of vectors that are related via a linear isometry. In particular, for a linear isometry r : R d → R d which is computable in time O(d) and a d-dimensional vector b, our algorithm for computing the orthogonalization of (b, r(b), r 2 (b),. .. , r d−1 (b)) uses O(d 2) floating point operations. This is in contrast to O(d 3) such operations that are required by the standard Gram-Schmidt algorithm. This improvement is directly applicable to bases that appear in ideal-lattice cryptography because those bases exhibit such " isometric structure ". The above-mentioned algorithm improves on a previous one of Gama, Howgrave-Graham, Nguyen (EUROCRYPT 2006) which used different techniques to achieve only a constant-factor speed-up for similar lattice bases. Interestingly, our present ideas can be combined with those from Gama et al. to achieve an even an larger practical speed-up. We next show how this new Gram-Schmidt algorithm can be applied towards lattice sampling in quadratic time using only linear space. The main idea is that rather than pre-computing and storing the Gram-Schmidt vectors, one can compute them " on-the-fly " while running th
Faster Homomorphic Linear Transformations in HElib
HElib is a software library that implements homomorphic encryption (HE), with a focus on effective use of packed ciphertexts. An important operation (which is used in bootstrapping, as well as in other applications) is applying a known linear map to a vector of encrypted data. In this paper, we describe several algorithmic improvements that significantly speed up this operation: in our experiments, our new algorithms were 30-75 times faster than those currently implemented in HElib for typical parameters.
Our techniques also reduce the size of the large public evaluation key, often using 33%-50% less space than the previous HElib implementation. We also implemented a new tradeoff that enables a drastic reduction in size, maybe a 25x factor or more for some parameters, paying only a 2-4x factor in runtime (and giving up some parallelization opportunities)
Practical product proofs for lattice commitments
We construct a practical lattice-based zero-knowledge argument for proving multiplicative relations between committed values. The underlying commitment scheme that we use is the currently most efficient one of Baum et al. (SCN 2018), and the size of our multiplicative proof (9 KB) is only slightly larger than the 7 KB required for just proving knowledge of the committed values. We additionally expand on the work of Lyubashevsky and Seiler (Eurocrypt 2018) by showing that the above-mentioned result can also apply when working over rings Zq[X]/(Xd+1) where Xd+1 splits into low-degree factors, which is a desirable property for many applications (e.g. range proofs, multiplications over
Practical Exact Proofs from Lattices: New Techniques to Exploit Fully-Splitting Rings
We propose a very fast lattice-based zero-knowledge proof system for exactly proving knowledge of a ternary solution to a linear equation over , which improves upon the protocol by Bootle, Lyubashevsky and Seiler (CRYPTO 2019) by producing proofs that are shorter by a factor of .
At the core lies a technique that utilizes the module-homomorphic BDLOP commitment scheme (SCN 2018) over the fully splitting cyclotomic ring to prove scalar products with the NTT vector of a secret polynomial
Complete Attack on RLWE Key Exchange with reused keys, without Signal Leakage
Key Exchange (KE) from RLWE (Ring-Learning with Errors) is a potential alternative to Diffie-Hellman (DH) in a post quantum setting. Key leakage with RLWE key exchange protocols in the context of key reuse has already been pointed out in previous work. The initial attack described by Fluhrer is designed in such a way that it only works on Peikert\u27s KE protocol and its variants that derives the shared secret from the most significant bits of the approximately equal keys computed by both parties. It does not work on Ding\u27s key exchange that uses the least significant bits to derive a shared key. The Signal leakage attack relies on changes in the signal sent by the responder reusing his key, in a sequence of key exchange sessions initiated by an attacker with a malformed key. A possible defense against this attack would be to require the initiator of a key exchange to send the signal, which is the one pass case of the KE protocol.
In this work, we describe a new attack on Ding\u27s one pass case without relying on the signal function output but using only the information of whether the final key of both parties agree. We also use LLL reduction to create the adversary\u27s keys in such a way that the party being compromised cannot identify the attack in trivial ways. This completes the series of attacks on RLWE key exchange with key reuse for all variants in both cases of the initiator and responder sending the signal. Moreover, we show that the previous Signal leakage attack can be made more efficient with fewer queries and how it can be extended to Peikert\u27s key exchange, which was used in the BCNS implementation and integrated with TLS and a variant used in the New Hope implementation
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